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Abstract—We use two large samples of firms to assess the effects of busi-
ness environment constraints, competition, export orientation, and owner-
ship on firm performance. We deal with omitted variables, errors in vari-
ables, and endogeneity, and find that few business constraints affect
performance. Replicating the analysis with Doing Business and Heritage
Foundation indicators of the business environment yields similar results.
In fact, country fixed effects, reflecting time-invariant differences in the
business environment as well as other factors such as health care and edu-
cation, matter more for firm performance than differences in the business
environment across firms within countries.
I. Introduction
THE efficiency of firms in developing countries, includ-ing the transition economies, is obviously central to
explaining the performance of these economies as a whole.
In many developing countries, numerous large firms were
historically state owned and widely regarded as inefficient.
Indeed, almost all firms in the transition economies started
as being state owned, with their objectives set consistent
with the dictates of central planning. To escape these limita-
tions, a combination of privatization, entry of new private
firms, and fundamental changes in the legal, institutional,
and regulatory systems has been at the core of the develop-
ment and transition process over the past two decades.
The above policies have been based on the premise that a
key determinant of firm performance in developing as well
as developed economies is the state of the business environ-
ment, defined broadly to include the key features of the
legal, regulatory, financial, and institutional systems.1
Indeed, it has been noted that the barriers to doing business
vary widely across regions and countries,2 and it has been
argued that the business environment will affect aggregate
performance, as well as exert influence on the operation of
financial markets.3 A sizable empirical literature supporting
various aspects of this view has appeared, using data at the
country, industry, and firm levels. However, the measure-
ment of the business environment has encountered major
methodological challenges that may have generated biased
estimates on account of issues such as errors in variables,
omitted variables, and endogeneity of regressors.
First, much of the knowledge in this area derives from
studies that rely on country-level proxy indicators of the
business environment, such as governance (Kaufmann,
2002; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999) regula-
tory constraints (Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Botero et al.,
2004); competitiveness (World Economic Forum); transpar-
ency (Transparency International); bureaucratic quality,
corruption, and law and order (Political Risk Services);
strength of the legal system (Durnev & Kim, 2005); and the
level of economic freedom in an economy (Heritage Foun-
dation). Many of these aggregate proxies of the actual phe-
nomena contain little or no variation over time and thus are
completely or almost indistinguishable from country-, sec-
tor-, or region-specific effects that may reflect many other
features than the business environment. Second, the aggre-
gate studies usually estimate the association between fea-
tures of business environment and macroeconomic perfor-
mance rather than identify the causal effects of the
environment on performance (see, for example, the discus-
sion in Levine & Zervos, 1998, and Rajan & Zingales,
1998).
Industry-level studies, such as Rajan and Zingales
(1998), Klapper and Love (2004), and Micco and Pages
(2006), estimate the effects of a particular feature of the
business environment on industry performance. They repre-
sent an advance over country-level studies in that they can
control for country and industry effects and thus suffer less
from an omitted variable bias. The trade-off is that in order
to identify the performance effect with industry-level data,
these studies assume that one country, the United States,
has an optimal value of the particular feature of business
environment and that there is some technological or other
reason that in all countries, some industries depend more
than others on this feature of the environment. While these
studies attempt to account for the possible endogeneity of
the business environment, the extent of their ability to
tackle this issue is naturally limited.
Finally, a number of firm-level studies have been carried
out in the past few years, taking advantage of cross-firm
variation in performance and in perceived or actual severity
of business environment constraints. While these studies
represent an important advance over the ones based on
more aggregate data, they also suffer from a number of the
aforementioned econometric problems. For example, using
a 1995 survey of about 440 firms in Bulgaria and Russia,
Pissarides, Singer, and Srejnar (2003) examine the absolute
and relative severity of various constraints and how it
relates to the characteristics of the manager, firm, and
sector of operation, but they do not address the issue of
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endogeneity of regressors. Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff
(2002a, 2002b) use a 1997 firm-level survey of about 1,400
firms in five transition economies to estimate the effects of
property rights and access to credit on profit reinvestment,
but also assume that all regressors are exogenous. Dollar,
Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005) use surveys
from eight developing countries covering nearly 6,500 firms
to look at the association between exporting and the invest-
ment climate. The empirical implementation relies, how-
ever, on probit estimations where perceived constraints are
entered on the right hand side and assumed to be exogen-
ous. Beck, Demirguc, and Maksimovic (2005) use the
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) of more than
4,000 firms in 54 countries to examine the effect of business
environment constraints on firm growth, but do not address
endogeneity, and in most estimations they enter the con-
straints one at a time rather than simultaneously. They also
do not control for country and industry heterogeneity with
country and industry fixed effects, relying instead on coun-
try random effects and a manufacturing and a services
dummy variable. Hallward-Driemeier, Wallstein, and Xu
(2006) use an investment climate survey administered in
2000 to 1,500 Chinese firms in five cities, with some con-
straints being measured by managerial perceptions and
others by management-provided information on phenomena
such as losses in sales due to power problems. The authors
are concerned with endogeneity, find the instrumental vari-
able approach infeasible, and use city-industry average
values of the business climate variables, together with city
information and sector dummies, to alleviate the endogene-
ity problem. They address the omitted variable problem by
entering all the constraint variables simultaneously, but firm
ownership is treated as exogenous. Finally, Ayyagari and
Demirguc-Kunt (2008) examine the importance of finan-
cing (but not other) constraints in explaining firm perfor-
mance using the cross-sectional WBES data for eighty
countries, relating firm growth rates to the different obsta-
cles that the firms report. They strive to control for endo-
geneity and, like this study, use information about perceived
constraints by other firms in the same industry and country
as instrumental variables for the perceived constraints in the
own firm. In short, although the literature is rich and infor-
mative, the conclusions that can be drawn are still quite ten-
tative because of the estimation issues discussed.4
In parallel to the investigations of the effects of business
environment, researchers have been analyzing the effects
on firm performance of three key structural features: the
extent of the firm’s export orientation, competition, and
ownership. The number of studies and findings is large, but
the overall sense is that the performance effects of exports
are found to be positive (see Tybout, 2003, for a review);
those of competition are found to be positive by Nickell
(1999), but questioned as a uniform effect by Carlin et al.
(2004) and Aghion et al. (2005); and the effect of owner-
ship is found to be generally positive for foreign ownership
but less clear-cut for domestic private ownership (Estrin
et al., 2009).5 Interestingly, while this work often uses the
same or similar dependent variables; each of them focuses
on a particular set of explanatory variables and usually does
not take into account the explanatory variables deemed
important in other strands of research. This raises the issue
of whether existing studies generate biased estimates on
account of omitted variables.
In this paper, we carry out an econometric analysis of a
large firm-level survey data set that includes measures of
performance, structural variables related to ownership,
competition and export orientation, and each firm’s top
manager’s perception of the business environment that his
or her firm faces. Specifically, we use the 2005 and 2002
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS), collected by the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank, to
examine what robust relationships, if any, can be identified
by linking firm performance in 26 transition countries to a
range of explanatory variables, including the firm’s busi-
ness environment, ownership, export orientation, and com-
petition. Aside from providing a large number of observa-
tions, over 4,000 firms in 2002 and 6,600 firms in 2005, the
BEEPS data set also provides data on firms over a six-year
period, as it includes three-year retrospective information
for each survey round. Our objective is to assess whether
the widely accepted claim that the business environment
and structural features of firms are major explanatory fac-
tors behind performance is supported in our large data set
under a series of econometric tests. Earlier research that
looked into the determinants of firm performance in the
transition countries has found that privately owned firms,
especially new private firms, have generally performed bet-
ter. The evidence also points to foreign participation and
exposure to export markets as factors associated with strong
performance, whether measured in terms of sales, labor pro-
ductivity, or total factor productivity (output relative to
labor and capital inputs).6 However, ownership change does
not appear to have had any positive impact on performance
without complementary changes in management structure,
financing, the competitive environment, or other factors
specific to the firm. Further, some recent evidence has sug-
gested that privatized domestic firms do not necessarily per-
form markedly better than the remaining state-owned firms.
4 There are also other conceptual issues, noted for instance by Carlin,
Schaffer, and Seabright (2006), who argue that subjective evaluations of
constraints can provide important insights but need to be carefully inter-
preted. For example, reported constraints for public goods, as against
those relating to finance, may require different interpretation, as the for-
mer may act as a common constraint on firms in a country, while the latter
may vary between firms, let alone between countries.
5 Surveys by Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Estrin et al. (2009) point
to the positive effect of foreign ownership. While Djankov and Murrell
also find a positive effect of domestic private ownership, Estrin et al. find
this effect to be much weaker and more varied.
6 See, for example, Carlin (2000), Claessens and Djankov (1999), Fryd-
man et al. (1999), and EBRD (1995, 1999).
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Moreover, the evidence suggests that all types of domestic
firms in transition countries continue to lag behind their
equivalents in advanced market economies.7 Domestic
firms tend to have lower efficiency in generating output
from inputs, while their scope for raising prices may be lim-
ited by product quality, poor marketing, and highly compe-
titive markets. In addition, they tend to have fewer intangi-
ble assets, greater vertical integration, and higher financing
costs. Research on the determinants of firm performance
has also begun to look at how factors external to the firm
can also exert an influence on performance. Studies using
earlier rounds of the BEEPS have suggested that a better
business environment can indeed have a positive effect on
performance, although the size—and robustness—of that
effect have remained open to question.8
Our paper extends this literature by relating firm perfor-
mance not only to a set of ownership variables but also to
other key attributes, including perceived constraints, com-
petition, and export orientation. Further, we pay particular
attention to the likely problems of endogeneity by adopting
a number of approaches, including instrumental variables
(IVs) and the use of average values of constraints for other
similar firms, and by assessing the seriousness of the
omitted variable bias. We focus on how efficiently firms
generate sales revenue, taking into account capital, labor,
and industry-level price. This is equivalent to total factor
productivity but broader in that it also captures improve-
ments in pricing within industry, marketing, and other
aspects of revenue generation. Our approach is similar to
other productivity analyses using firm-level data since very
few have firm-level prices. We accordingly emphasize the
importance of this measure because the performance of dif-
ferent types of firms may vary for a number of reasons,
including differences in efficiencies in generating output
from inputs, but also differences in the ability to charge
high prices due to diverse product quality or marketing,
intangible assets and the cost of capital, location in highly
competitive industries, efficiency of vertical integration,
and the extent of outsourcing. In order to capture as many
of these factors as possible, we focus on the revenues of the
firm as our dependent variable. Our approach explicitly
allows the efficiency of different firms to vary on account
of any of these factors. We do not presume that firms are in
a technical or economic steady state but rather that they are
trying to improve their performance by discovering new
methods of production, importing advanced technologies,
launching new products, learning new managerial and mar-
keting techniques, and implementing other changes. The
extent to which firms are able to succeed may, of course,
also depend on the macroeconomic, legal, and institutional
environment. The paper focuses on this association—or its
absence.
We find that foreign (but not domestic private) ownership
and competition have an impact on performance, measured
as the level of sales controlling for inputs. Export orientation
of the firm does not have an effect on performance once
ownership is taken into account. When we analyze the
impact of perceived constraints, we show that few retain
explanatory power once they are introduced jointly rather
than one at a time, or when country and year fixed effects
are introduced. Indeed, country fixed effects largely absorb
the explanatory power of the constraints that individual
firms face. Replicating the analysis with commonly used
country-level indicators of the business environment (Heri-
tage Foundation indices and World Bank’s Doing Business
indicators), as well as a different firm-level data set (AMA-
DEUS), we do not find much of a relationship between con-
straints and performance. Given that much donor funding
has been conditioned on improvements in business environ-
ment, the question arises as to whether other development
policies that use bilateral or multilateral funding yield simi-
larly insignificant effects. We take a step toward answering
this question by exploring whether indicators such as country-
wide tertiary school enrollment or per capita expenditures
on health care have a significant effect on firm performance
relative to the business environment constraints. We find
that health care expenditure per GDP has a strong, positive
effect on firm performance relative to the BEEPS and Doing
Business indicators of business environment, but that its
effect is less significant when estimated jointly with the
Heritage Foundation indicators. Including GDP per capita
has a positive effect on performance and suggests that the
country fixed effects that eliminate the effect of the indivi-
dual business constraints are well approximated by inter-
country differences in GDP per capita. Our analysis brings
into question an important part of the conventional wisdom
in this area. It indicates that country fixed effects, reflecting
time-invariant differences in the business environment but
also many other factors, matter for firm performance, but
that differences in the business environment observed by top
managers do not. This suggests that the analyst’s ability to
identify the effects of business environment on firm perfor-
mance, and possibly the effects themselves, have been more
limited than has been widely assumed.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we
describe the data, while in section III, we outline the analy-
tical framework. We present our empirical findings in sec-
tion IV. Given our findings, section V then explores further
what factors appear to affect firm performance. Section VI
concludes.
II. Data Description
We base most of our analysis on the 2002 and 2005
rounds of the BEEPS.9 The BEEPS data are stratified ran-
7 See, for example, Sabirianova, Svejnar, & Terrell (2005b) and Hanou-
sek, Kocenda, and Svejnar (2007).
8 See Carlin et al. (2001).
9 The BEEPS rounds for 2002 and 2005—including questionnaires,
information on sampling methodology and complete responses—are
available online at http://www.ebrd.com/economics.
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dom samples of firms. Concerning ownership, most firms in
the samples were privatized or had always been private
from the start of their operations. However, quota sampling
was imposed for foreign-owned companies (defined as hav-
ing a foreign stake of at least 50%) and state-owned compa-
nies (defined as the state owning more than 50%). These
quotas were set at 10% of the total sample for each cate-
gory. The distribution of the sample between manufacturing
and service sectors was determined according to these sec-
tors’ relative contribution to GDP in each country. Firms
that operated in sectors subject to government price re-
gulation and prudential supervision, such as banking, elec-
tric power, rail transport, and water, were excluded from
the sample.10 Firms that had 10,000 employees or more were
excluded from the sample, as were firms that had started
operations in 2002, 2003, or 2004. Around 90% of the
BEEPS sample in both years were small and medium enter-
prises. The 2002 round of the BEEPS surveyed over 6,100
firms from 26 transition countries, while the 2005 round
covered nearly 9,100 firms in the same countries. The sum-
mary statistics on the number of observations, means, and
standard deviations of the key variables are given in table 1
TABLE 1.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
2002 2005
Observation Mean S.D. Observation Mean S.D.
A: Summary Statistics
Sales 4,504 2,290 10,428 6,665 3,376 17,503
Employment 6,122 143 505 9,097 105 364
Fixed assets 3,388 2,384 33,893 4,637 1,622 10,582
Number of competitors 6,029 0.82 0.39 8,479 0.82 0.39
Ownership (privatization) 6,153 0.15 0.36 9,098 0.14 0.35
Ownership (new private) 6,153 0.55 0.550 9,098 0.66 0.47
Ownerschip (state) 6,153 0.14 0.35 9,098 0.09 0.28
Ownership (other) 6,153 0.02 0.12 9,098 0.01 0.09
Ownership (foreign) 6,153 0.14 0.35 9,098 0.10 0.30
Exports as % of sales 6,055 11.16 25.05 9,039 8.76 22.34
Workforce ratio: University/secondary education 5,289 1.36 4.67 6,930 1.24 3.83
Company age 6,153 14.70 18.70 9,090 15.55 17.46
University/secondary education  Age 5,289 19.47 114.49 6,925 22.84 124.76
Permanent employment 3 years ago 6,066 134.73 501.85 8,967 101.51 405.07
Part-time employment 3 years ago 5,872 6.96 44.21 8,873 5.65 31.70
% change in fixed assets (3-year period) 5,717 16.30 46.66 8,787 11.90 32.17
% change in exports (3-year period) 6,026 5.44 33.76 9,030 4.44 29.81
% change in employment (3-year period) 6,059 34.89 135.99 8,967 30.30 133.53
% change in sales (3-year period) 5,832 21.69 62.74 8,764 12.99 39.25
% change in sales per worker (3-year period) 5,753 14.69 74.90 8,645 12.35 89.17
B: Average Number of Competitors
Construction 772 2.85 0.39 443 2.86 0.41
Manufacturing 1,463 2.72 0.49 2,161 2.75 0.49
Transport, storage, and communications 474 2.72 0.52 339 2.79 0.47
Wholesale and retail trade 1,847 2.88 0.34 949 2.84 0.40
Real estate renting and business services 637 2.82 0.41 396 2.82 0.45
Other services 768 2.81 0.43 317 2.74 0.53
Others 68 2.53 0.63 60 2.53 0.68
C: Average Constraints
Access to financing 5,810 2.33 1.16 8,647 2.26 1.14
Cost of financing 5,864 2.53 1.13 8,698 2.51 1.13
Tax rates 6,060 2.76 1.11 8,951 2.75 1.10
Tax administration 5,953 2.54 1.14 8,895 2.47 1.13
Custom/foreign trade regulations 5,649 2.04 1.12 8,267 1.91 1.07
Business licensing and permit 5,906 2.02 1.08 8,776 1.98 1.04
Labour regulations 5,946 1.74 0.94 8,886 1.87 0.98
Uncertainty about regulatory policies 6,000 2.85 1.09 8,819 2.53 1.12
Macroeconomic instability 5,998 2.76 1.11 8,823 2.52 1.12
Functioning of the judiciary 5,728 2.06 1.08 8,417 2.06 1.10
Corruption 5,713 2.24 1.16 8,497 2.16 1.14
Street crime theft and disorder 5,857 1.96 1.07 8,661 1.82 1.01
Organized crime 5,663 1.81 1.09 8,394 1.64 0.97
Anticompetitive practices 5,871 2.25 1.11 8,739 2.30 1.11
Infrastructure 6,122 1.54 0.70 9,043 1.54 0.73
Average of all constraints 6,134 2.24 0.67 9,064 2.17 0.66
10 In the 2005 round, of the eligible firms that were approached the refu-
sal rate was around 48%.
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for the 2002 and 2005 data sets. Values are expressed in U.S.
dollars.
As can be seen from table 1, the key variables display rea-
sonable mean values and significant variation. Panel A indi-
cates that the average age of the firm was around fifteen
years. The average firm had between 105 and 145 employ-
ees in both surveys. Employment, fixed assets, sales, and
sales per worker all increased between 1999 and 2002, as
well as between 2002 and 2005. In the case of employment,
growth over these three-year periods was greater than 30%,
while for sales, growth actually decelerated after 2002. The
increase in sales per worker was roughly equal over both
three-year periods. The variation in employment, sales, and
capital across firms and in their growth has been substantial,
as indicated by the standard deviations. Exports have consti-
tuted about 10% of sales, and there has again been consider-
able variation around the mean in both years. In terms of
ownership-related performance statistics not reported in
table 1, foreign firms have had about 40% higher levels of
sales per worker than state-owned firms. Privatized state
firms have had around 10% higher levels, while new private
firms have been about 20% higher. Overall, the average for-
eign firm has produced 20% to 50% more sales revenue and
has had 20% to 40% higher revenue per worker than the
average domestic firm. However, the difference between
foreign and domestic firms could be due, in part or fully, to
foreign owners acquiring better-performing firms.11
Panel B of table 1 provides descriptive information con-
cerning competition, specifically the average number of
competitors in the domestic market reported by firms in both
2002 and 2005, disaggregated by sector. What emerges is
that there is little perceived difference across regions or sec-
tors, as well as little change over the two periods. The aver-
age number of perceived competitors falls between 2.5 and
3.0 in each sector, but there is considerable variation within
each sector and this variation has risen over time.
Panel C of table 1 gives for 2002 and 2005 the mean con-
straint scores and the associated standard deviations for the
fifteen main constraints that the top manager of each firm
was asked to evaluate. Individual firm scores for each con-
straint to doing business range from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (a
major obstacle). The panel shows considerable variation in
the average value across constraints, ranging from 1.54 in
both years for the presence of anticompetitive practices to
2.85 in 2002 for uncertainty about regulatory policies and
2.75 in 2005 for the constraining nature of tax rates. There
is also considerable variation in the reported values of indi-
vidual constraints across firms, with the standard deviation
of the responses being around or exceeding 1.0 for all but
one constraint (infrastructure) in each year. Averaging the
reported values of all fifteen constraints, the mean score in
both years was 2.2, with a standard deviation of around 0.7.
Further, the variation is considerable when we look for each
country and year at the average value of the reported con-
straint at the level of four-digit NACE industry and across
firm size.
As we discuss later, we have also been able to construct a
panel component of approximately 1,300 firms that partici-
pated in both the 2002 and 2005 rounds of the BEEPS.
While relatively small, this panel data set is useful for a
complementary analysis to the pooled cross-sectional data
set.12
III. Analytical Framework
In analyzing the determinants of the efficiency with
which the firms generate sales revenue from inputs, we use
an augmented Cobb-Douglas function,
ln yit ¼ b0 þ Rkbklnxikt þ qZit þ dIit þ hCþ 1Tt þ vi þ eit;
ð1Þ
where yit represents the revenue of firm i in period t; x’s
represent the capital and labor inputs; Zit is a vector of the
business environment and structural variables (business
constraints, export orientation of the firm, extent of product
market competition, and firm ownership); the I’s, C’s, and
T’s denote a set of dummy variables for industries, coun-
tries, and years, respectively; vi is an unobserved time-
invariant firm-specific effect that we control for in some
estimations; and eit is an independently distributed error
term. Equation (1) allows efficiency to vary across institu-
tional and structural variables, industries, countries, and
time.
Equation (1) represents our basic specification. We also
have access to a measure of material inputs, but this has
fewer observations and is noisier than the measures of labor
and capital. However, to check the robustness of our results,
we also estimate equation (1) with the log of value added as
the left-hand-side variable (value added being defined as
the difference between revenues and the material input vari-
able). Moreover, as we discuss below, using the panel data,
we are able to provide estimates of an initial value equation
in which we regress the rate of change of revenues between
2002 and 2005 on the 2002–2005 rate of change of labor
and capital and on the 2002 levels of the business environ-
ment constraints and the structural variables (ownership,
competition, and export orientation).
In estimating equation (1), the question that naturally
arises is how best to control for the potential endogeneity
and selection issues related to some of the explanatory vari-
ables. In particular, given the nature of the privatization
process, firm ownership may not be assigned at random,
and there is generally a need to account for possible unob-
served heterogeneity and to isolate the effect of inputs, per-
11 This finding is corroborated by other studies of individual or smaller
sets of countries (see, for example, Sabirianova et al., 2005b).
12 To make the matching of the panel firms between 2002 and 2005 data
sets possible, the latter includes the variable seno2002, comprising the
serial numbers of the participating firms from the former survey.
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ceived business environment, and structural factors on a
firm’s performance from the effects of performance on
these explanatory variables.13 We use an instrumental vari-
able (IV) approach, noting that we are fortunate that the
BEEPS data contain a large number of firms because IV
estimates are consistent but not unbiased. However, con-
trolling adequately for endogeneity is not an easy task in
survey data that do not come from a natural experiment.
We use several complementary approaches to estimate the
average effect of the explanatory variables on performance.
First, for several key variables, the 2002 and 2005 samples
provide information on the rate of change between 1999
and 2002 and between 2002 and 2005, so that we can use
three-year lagged levels and lagged three-year differences
in some of these variables as potential instrumental vari-
ables for our cross-sectional analysis of the 2002 and 2005
levels of variables. For each year in each firm, we also have
data on the number of workers with university and second-
ary education, and, following Marschak and Andrews
(1944) and Schmidt (1988), we can use the ratio of these
two inputs (skill ratio) as an instrumental variable. The
rationale for the skill ratio instrument comes from economic
optimization and an assumed exogeneity of input prices
(wages). In particular, if the production function is Cobb-
Douglas and the firm maximizes profit or minimizes cost,
the first-order conditions dictate that the ratio of inputs
equals the ratio of input prices and technological para-
meters. If the firm is a price taker in the input markets, the
ratio of inputs reflects these exogenous factors.14 The use of
a skill ratio hence relies on the exogeneity of the ratio of
wages of the more and less educated workers at the firm
level and on variation in this wage ratio across regions,
countries, and over time. Since firms in our survey operate
in very different regions and countries, and returns to
human capital have risen over time, the ratio of wages of
workers with greater and lesser education varies consider-
ably across our observations.
Given that the bias of two-stage least squares is propor-
tional to the degree of overidentification, our approach has
been to estimate the first-stage regressions with as few IVs
as possible, while ensuring that the IVs have adequate
explanatory power and pass the overidentification tests. In
particular, we start by estimating equation (1) in levels on
the pooled 2002 and 2005 samples of firms, and we use as
IVs the age and location of the firm, the skill ratio inter-
acted with the three main regions covered by our data, the
skill ratio interacted with firm age and the three regions, a
three-year lagged number of full-time employees, the per-
centage change in fixed assets in the preceding three years,
and the percentage change in exports over the preceding
three years.15 We use these variables as instruments for the
levels of the capital and labor inputs, four categories of
ownership, and the export orientation of the firm. We find
that the IVs are good predictors of all the potentially endo-
genous variables and pass the J (Sargan) overidentification
test.16 We treat the extent of competition in the firm’s pro-
duct market as exogenous to a given firm.
Conceptually, the IVs that we use reflect (a) the environ-
ment and background of the firm (location and age), (b)
labor market and technological factors (relative wages and
technology determining the skill ratio), (c) Arellano-Bond
type factors (lagged percentage change in assets and exports
determining the current levels of the potentially endoge-
neous variables), and (d) the effect of three-year lagged
level of full-time employment on current levels of the
potentially endogeneous variables. The credibility of our
results would naturally be enhanced if similar coefficient
estimates were generated with alternative choices (subsets)
of instruments. In particular, the use of a lagged level of
full-time employment as an IV for current levels of vari-
ables may be regarded as questionable, even with a three-
year lag, in the sense that the presence of a fixed effect
could induce correlation between the IV and the error term
in equation (1). We have therefore estimated a series of
exactly identified models with various subsets of the IVs
listed in categories a to d. From the first-stage F-tests we
have found that most of these IVs are needed because dif-
ferent sets of IVs predict different endogenous variables.
For instance, the location and age variables tend to be
important predictors of the level of inputs and ownership,
while lagged percentage changes in assets and exports are
good predictors of the current export orientation of the firm.
Interestingly, our results do not change due to the inclusion
of the three-year lagged level of full-time employment as
an instrument. The IVs we use hence have merit, but as is
usual with internal IVs, there remains some question as to
whether they yield unbiased estimates. As we discuss
below, we perform another robustness check by reestimat-
ing equation (1) in the form of a Solow residual or total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) equation to obtain coefficient esti-
mates on the variables of interest without the need to
instrument the inputs.
In order to assess the robustness of our results with
respect to the business environment (institutional) con-
straints, we have estimated these effects in several ways.
First, we have carried out estimations using the individual
values of the constraints directly as reported by the top
13 Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2008), for instance, show that better-per-
forming firms tend to be privatized first, while Sabirianova et al. (2005a)
find that foreign firms acquire better-performing domestic firms.
14 We use these assumptions but note that if more complicated labor
market matching occurred (for instance, assortative matching of workers
with firms), the assumption of exogeneity could not be maintained.
15 The location variable is a dummy variable coded 1.0 for cities and
towns of at least 50,000 inhabitants and 0.0 otherwise. The regions are
Central Europe and Baltics, the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), and southeastern Europe.
16 The summary statistics from the first-stage estimates are reported in
the tables with the second-stage results. Complete results of the first-stage
regressions are available on request. Given the choice of IVs, the need to
address the endogeneity issue is also indicated by the Hausman-Wu F-
tests and Durbin-Hausman-Wu chi square tests that suggest that the null
hypothesis of the exogeneity of the regressors is rejected in our data.
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managers of the interviewed firms. This approach has the
advantage that it provides a direct firm-specific measure
and generates high variance in the values of these variables,
but it may produce biased estimates if a manager’s percep-
tion of the severity of constraints is, for instance, influenced
by the performance of his or her firm.17 Second, in order to
address this potential endogeneity bias, we have carried out
estimations in which we instrument the individual man-
agers’ values of constraints with the above-mentioned, as
well as other, IVs. Third, we have used an average value of
each constraint reported by other firms, where the average
is based on responses of either all other firms in a given
industry in each country and year or all other firms of a
given size in a given industry in each country and year. The
advantage of using the responses of other firms that are sub-
ject to the same external shocks is that the value of the con-
straint is not affected by the firm’s own performance. It
turns out that the estimates based on all the above
approaches are similar, with estimates based on the average
value of constraints reported by other firms of a given size
in a given NACE two-digit industry in each country and
year being slightly more frequently significant than others.
Since our analysis suggests that the literature has overstated
the significance of the effect of business constraints on firm
performance, in what follows we report the set of estimates
based on the average values of constraints reported each
year by other firms within a given two-digit industry and
firm size category (small, medium, and large) in a given
country, which provide the greatest support for the existing
literature and go most against our thesis. This approach
gives both a considerable variation in the values of con-
straints and a sufficient number of firms per cell to mini-
mize problems associated with potential measurement error.
The standard errors of all reported estimates are clustered
by year, country, industry, and firm size. Clustering by just
year and country or using unclustered (just heteroskedastic-
robust) standard errors yields similar results.
Finally, we perform another robustness check by reesti-
mating equation (1) in the form of a Solow (TFP) residual.
This amounts to subtracting from each firm’s revenue its
inputs weighted by industry and country-specific cost
shares. We construct the cost shares from our firm-level
data in the standard way done in the productivity literature:
by computing for each firm the cost shares (for example,
expenditure on labor in total cost) and then taking an aver-
age in a given industry and year. We then regress the Solow
residual (TFP) on the explanatory variables that we use—
constraints (as defined above), competition, and ownership
but leaving out exports as an explanatory variable. The
coefficient on exports is statistically insignificant in all the
other regressions we run, and its exclusion does not materi-
ally affect the results. This obviates the need to instrument
because the inputs are now part of the dependent variable,
constraints are purged of endogeneity by taking averages,
competition is exogenous to a given firm, and privatization
is taken as predetermined because it took place in the pre-
ceding decade and the adjustment had thus already taken
place by the time of our sample period.
Our second approach is to use the (smaller) panel data set
that we have constructed from the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS
surveys to explain the three-year rate of change in perfor-
mance. For this analysis, we have over 600 firms, and as we
discuss below, the sample is relatively representative of
the larger cross-section of firms. The panel data generate
broadly similar estimates as the entire pooled cross-
sectional sample, suggesting that the panel data set is a
usable subset of the entire sample. Using the panel data, we
estimate an equation in which we regress the rate of change
of revenues between 2002 and 2005 on the 2002–2005 rate
of change of labor and capital and on the 2002 levels of the
business environment constraints and structural variables.
This initial value regression parallels the specification used
by Levine and Zervos (1998) at the macrolevel and allows
us to ask the question of how initial (2002) conditions affect
the subsequent (2002–2005) rate of change of perfor-
mance.18
The principal variables whose performance effect we
analyze include the intensity of the various constraints
reported by the firms, firm ownership, the extent of compe-
tition faced by the firm, and the extent of exporting carried
out by the firm. In addition, coefficients on country dummy
variables provide an estimate of the effect on efficiency of
the business environment at the country level. We also
apply a sector fixed effect in the estimations reported below
and, where possible, a year dummy.
IV. Effects of Ownership, Competition, Exports, and
Business Environment
A. Level of Efficiency
Table 2 contains our baseline IV estimates without the
explanatory variables capturing the business environment
(institutional) constraints. These regressions use pooled
data from the entire 2002 and 2005 BEEPS and correspond
to studies that have examined the efficiency effects of
exporting, competition, and firm ownership. The number of
observations varies from 5,624 to 5,897, depending on spe-
cification, and the results are therefore based on the largest
data set available to us. All regressions include country,
year, and sector (industry) fixed effects. State ownership
serves as the reference, and the coefficients on other owner-
17 For example, managers of efficient firms operate near full capacity
and feel constrained, while managers of poorly performing firms may
have considerable unused capacity and do not find many constraints bind-
ing.
18 This is about as far as we can go in this type of estimation, however,
since for most firms, we have data on the percentage change in revenues
between 2002 and 2005, but we lack observations for the rate of change
from 2002 to 2005 for many of the explanatory variables. As such, we
cannot estimate equation (1) in first differences.
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ship categories hence reflect the log point differential effect
relative to state ownership.
Column 1 reports a base estimate where just the two fac-
tors, labor and capital, are included. The labor coefficient is
relatively small and not statistically significant, but as we
will show, it is larger and significant in the more preferred
models that we present in columns 5 to 8. Column 2 adds in
the ratio of exports to sales, and this variable enters posi-
tively and significantly. Columns 3 and 4 introduce the
competition variable, defined as 1 if the firm has three or
more competitors and 0 otherwise. Entered alone with the
inputs, the coefficient is positive but small and insignificant.
This is also the case when competition is entered alongside
the export share and controlling for inputs. The coefficient
on the export share remains large and highly significant.
Columns 5 to 8 introduce the ownership variables. In these
specifications, the labor and capital coefficients are both
positive and statistically significant, and their sum
approaches unity. It is of interest to note that the coeffi-
cients on both the privatized and new private firms are
negative and, in the latter case, marginally significant in
two of the four specifications. By contrast, foreign owner-
ship has a large and positive coefficient that is significant at
the 1% level. The positive effect of foreign ownership is
maintained, but the significance of the negative effect of
new private ownership disappears when the export share
and competition variables are entered. Interestingly, when
we control for ownership, the export share variable loses all
significance, suggesting that studies of the export effect that
do not control for firm (especially foreign) ownership may
be detecting a spurious effect of exporting on firm perfor-
mance. In columns 7 and 8, where most or all the explana-
tory variables are entered simultaneously, we find that com-
petition has a positive and significant (at the 10% to 11%
level) impact on performance, with foreign ownership
exerting a strong and positive impact on performance as
well. Being privatized or being a new private firm remains
negatively signed but insignificant relative to the reference
of state-owned firms. The augmented specifications in col-
umns 5 to 8 also generate acceptable values of the J- and F-
tests related to the selection of IVs in the first stage of esti-
mation. Our preferred (all-encompassing) specification in
column 8 points to the importance of foreign ownership and
(to a lesser extent) competition on performance. The corre-
sponding value-added regressions, reported in table A1 in
the appendix, yield qualitatively similar results except that
the estimated coefficient on competition, while positive, is
not statistically significant.19
TABLE 2.—REVENUE EFFICIENCY—BASELINE REGRESSIONS (IV ESTIMATION WITH YEAR, COUNTRY, AND SECTOR FIXED EFFECTS)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Log employment 0.189 0.190 0.203 0.236 0.449 0.466 0.508 0.503
[0.177] [0.177] [0.177] [0.163] [0.184]** [0.200]** [0.179]*** [0.188]***
Log assets 0.904 0.880 0.891 0.826 0.522 0.498 0.467 0.470
[0.190]*** [0.190]*** [0.182]*** [0.177]*** [0.182]*** [0.213]** [0.192]** [0.177]**
Log (1 þ export/sales) 0.743 0.981 0.540 0.218
[0.359]** [0.392]** [0.493] [0.506]
More than 3 competitors 0.040 0.066 0.072 0.075
[0.052] [0.050] [0.044]* [0.046]
Ownership (privatized) 0.435 0.205 0.222 0.159
[0.428] [0.423] [0.384] [0.405]
Ownership (new private) 0.531 0.523 0.408 0.424
[0.284]* [0.283]* [0.258] [0.263]
Ownership (foreign) 1.196 1.728 1.388 1.591
[0.367]*** [0.544]*** [0.350]*** [0.520]***
Constant 1.352 1.330 1.291 1.297 2.285 2.302 2.135 2.141
[0.251]*** [0.251]*** [0.273]*** [0.265]*** [0.417]*** [0.444]*** [0.444]*** [0.427]***
Observations 5,897 5,844 5,677 5,624 5,897 5,844 5,677 5,624
J-test 17.78 14.12 16.89 12.16 3.19 1.58 1.50 0.95
p-value 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.016 0.203 0.209 0.472 0.328
First-stage F-tests
Log employment 109.14 107.58 112.52 110.63 109.14 107.58 112.52 110.63
Log assets 50.63 49.97 48.24 47.56 50.63 49.97 48.24 47.56
Log (1 þ export/sales) 18.05 18.09 18.05 18.09
Ownership (privatized) 22.56 22.17 22.20 21.82
Ownership (new private) 70.74 71.27 70.98 71.34
Ownership (foreign) 12.36 11.96 12.42 12.02
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 26.74 20.65 19.68 22.04 13.81 10.82 11.79 11.42
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry, and firm size (small, medium, and large) in brackets. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. All models were estimated using
IVs for log employment, log assets, log(1 þ export/sales) and three ownership dummies. The IVs are firm’s age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio  age interaction, location (city), % change in fixed assets
in previous period, % change in exports in previous period, and full-time employees in previous period. The skill ratio and the skill ratio  Age Interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE, and CIS)
dummies.
19 Henceforth, we do not report additional value-added regressions as
they are based on a smaller sample and a noisy measure of material
inputs, and generally yield results that are similar to those in the revenue
regressions.
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Having estimated the base performance equation, we pro-
ceed to considering the impact of business environment
constraints on firm performance. Throughout the analysis,
we use for each constraint the average value of responses of
other firms in the same two-digit sector, firm size (small,
medium, and large), country, and year. The other unre-
ported specifications yield similar results. Entering all fif-
teen categories of constraints invariably yields insignificant
estimates, and the question naturally arises as to whether
collinearity across constraints induces this insignificance of
results. We have examined the relationships among the var-
ious constraints and find that most constraints are not highly
correlated, although several pairs display high correlation
(such as access to financing and cost of financing, tax rates
and tax administration, uncertainty about regulatory poli-
cies and macroeconomic instability, and street crime and
organized crime). This pair-wise correlation is also detected
in an ANOVA regression that we have run to assess the
extent to which the variation in the value of any given con-
straint can be explained by the other constraints. In what
follows, we enter only one of each of these pair-wise corre-
lated constraint variables, noting that it generally does not
matter which of the two is entered. We also exclude the
constraint related to labor regulation, as it is almost comple-
tely explained by the interaction of country and year fixed
effects. This leaves us with nine constraints whose effects
we analyze in the remainder of the paper. As may be seen
from table A2, the partial correlation coefficients among
these nine constraints are relatively low, and the total R2 in
the reported regressions of each constraint on others is at or
below 0.4 in all except one regression (corruption), where it
is at 0.51. When we add country, year, and sector fixed
effects to the regressions in table A2, we increase the R2 in
the constraints regressions to 0.42–0.59. Finally, adding all
other regressors from the IV revenue regressions raises the
R2 to 0.42–0.59. Collinearity among the constraints is hence
limited.
Table 3 provides a first pass at including the nine con-
straints in the performance regression: individually (col-
umns 1–9), as an average of all fifteen constraints (column
10), and with all nine constraints entered together (column
11). Despite the obvious omitted variable problem, we report
the specifications with the constraints entered one at a time
because this approach has been used frequently in the litera-
ture, and much of the accepted wisdom on the effects of
institutions and regulation on performance derives from
these types of specifications. In line with a large part of the
literature, the regressions in table 3 are without country,
year, and sector fixed effects. (This model appears to be mis-
specified compared to a model in table 4, which includes
these fixed effects, in that the labor coefficient is small and
insignificant, and the p-values on the J-test are very small.)
It can be seen that when entered individually, all constraints
except one enter negatively, as would be expected from the
existing literature, and most are significant at 1% or 5% test
levels. In these specifications, we replicate the conventional
wisdom obtained in many studies that the business or institu-
tional environment matters and that more severe constraints
result in poorer performance. The regression with the aver-
age value of all fifteen constraints, a proxy for the overall
severity of the business environment, also yields a negative
and statistically significant coefficient.
When all the constraints are entered simultaneously in
the IV estimation in table 3, however, the infrastructure
and, to a lesser extent, tax rate and macro instability con-
straints remain negative and significant, but others lose sig-
nificance or, in the case of crime, theft, and disorder,
become positive and significant, which is counterintuitive.
Hence, when we correct at least in part for the possible
omitted variables problem, the negative effect of most busi-
ness environment constraints on performance disappears.
As may be seen from table A3, the corresponding ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimates are very similar for the indi-
vidually entered constraints (columns 1–10), and they differ
only slightly when all the constraints are entered simulta-
neously (column 11) in that four of the nine constraints
retain a negative coefficient.
Table 4 repeats the same exercise but includes country,
year, and sector fixed effects whose omission may have
biased the estimates in table 3. In this case, the significance
of the coefficients on inputs, ownership, exports, and com-
petition is similar to those in the base estimations in table 2:
foreign ownership and having three or more competitors
exert a positive and significant impact, while export orienta-
tion does not, and the effect of new private firms becomes
negative and statistically significant in some specifications.
However, the picture changes substantially with respect to
the business environment constraints. While most of the
constraints entered individually retain their negative coeffi-
cient, only one, on corruption, is statistically significant.
The effect of the average of all constraints, reported in col-
umn 10, is statistically insignificant, as are all the constraint
coefficients in column 11, where all constraints are entered
simultaneously. The corresponding OLS estimates in table
A4 are similar in that only one constraint—this time, crime,
theft, and disorder—has a significant negative coefficient
when the constraints are entered individually, and only one
has a significant (but positive) coefficient when all the con-
straints are entered simultaneously. An examination of the
role played by the country, year, and sector effects indicates
that it is the country as well as country with year fixed
effects, in particular, that serve to knock out the signifi-
cance of the individual (and, in the case of OLS, also the
jointly entered) constraints. Hence, once we control for
country-wide differences in the business environment
(together with aggregate shocks and all other differences),
the negative effects of virtually all constraints disappear.
Our findings in tables 3 and 4 are striking in their contrast
to the literature and accepted wisdom. We have therefore
performed a variety of robustness checks and analytical
extensions that we report in the remainder of the paper. As
we show, our basic findings remain unaltered.
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Our first set of analytical extensions relates to the report-
ing of constraints. It is possible that different respondents
center their ratings of constraints differently (for example,
some are tougher and some are more benevolent evalua-
tors). It might also be that some respondents use the entire
range of possible answers, while others tend to use more
the middle of the range (on a scale from 1 to 4, some
respondents might use only 2 and 3 as an answer, whereas
others might use the whole range from 1 to 4). In tables A5
and A6, we check the robustness of our results from tables
3 and 4 against these possible behavioral patterns. In parti-
cular, we subtract the individual firm’s average value of all
fifteen constraints from each reported constraint and divide
the result by the standard deviation of all answers of the
firm (that is, we control for attitude as well as the fact that
some people might use the full range of available answers
while others might not). In both tables, we also include the
average value of all constraints in each firm as a regressor
to assess the part played by the average reported severity of
constraints and the deviation of individual constraints from
this mean level. As may be seen from tables A5 and A6, the
estimates based on the standardized constraint variables
lead to the same conclusions as the results in tables 3 and 4.
In particular, estimates without country, sector, and year
fixed effects (table A5) suggest that the average level of
constraints reported by each firm has a negative effect on
performance. Moreover, the coefficients on most individual
constraints entered one at a time are insignificant; two
are negative and one is positive. When the constraints are
entered jointly, three coefficients are negative, and six are
insignificant. Taking into account the negative coefficient
on the average of all constraints, these results parallel the
findings in table 3 that constraints have a negative effect on
performance. When the country, sector, and year fixed
effects are included (table A6), the effect of the average
level of constraints of each firm becomes insignificant, sug-
gesting that the previously significant effect was picking up
the country-sector-year effect. Moreover, only one indivi-
dual constraint (tax rates) has a negative effect regardless of
whether the constraints are entered one at a time or jointly.
The results in table A6 hence parallel the findings in table 4
and indicate that once we control for fixed country, sector,
and time differences, the negative effects of virtually all
business environment constraints disappear.
Our second robustness check entails estimating equation
(1) in the form of the Solow (TFP) residual and thus avoid-
ing the need to instrument the input variables. These OLS
results, estimated without country, sector, and year fixed
effects, are reported in table A7. As may be seen from this
table, when the constraints are entered one at a time or
simultaneously, five of the nine coefficients are significantly
negative, two are insignificant, and two (on customs/foreign
trade regulations and on anticompetitive practices) are posi-
tive. The coefficient on the average of all constraints
(column 10) is statistically insignificant. When we replicate
the estimation with country, sector, and year fixed effects,
three coefficients are negative, five are insignificant, and
one is positive.20 The Solow (TFP) residual approach hence
generates broadly similar results to those reported in tables
3 and 4, with fewer estimated coefficients being significant
in the specification with country, sector, and year effects.
We have also extended the analysis by looking at the
possible impact that interactions of constraints might have
on performance, in line with recent explorations in the
development literature (see Aghion et al., 2005, 2006). The
intuition here is that, say, corruption may or may not have a
direct impact itself, but it may exert an effect through its
association with other constraints related to government
policies and regulations, such as the functioning of the judi-
ciary, uncertainty about regulatory policies, labor regula-
tions, business licensing, and tax administration and tax
rates. To explore whether this is indeed the case, we have
augmented the base model with interactions of constraints
that may be hypothesized to be related. For example, we
have interacted corruption with functioning of the judiciary,
uncertainty about regulatory policies, labor regulations,
business licensing, and tax administration and tax rates.
Neither when the interactions are entered one at a time nor
when they are all entered simultaneously do we find statisti-
cally significant results.21 This example is representative in
that we are unable to find any robust evidence for other
interactions either.
In another set of extensions, we have explored the idea
of heterogeneity across regions and examined whether sig-
nificant results can be obtained if we estimate the models
separately within each of the three main regions covered by
our data: Central Europe and the Baltics (CEB), southeast-
ern Europe (SEE), and the CIS. The findings from these
estimations allow the slope coefficients to vary by region,
and the results are similar to those presented for the sample
as a whole. When the country, year, and sector fixed effects
are excluded, few constraints are significant, and a number
of the signs are counterintuitive. When the country, year,
and sector fixed effects are included, virtually all con-
straints lose significance.
One important result that we are obtaining in our analysis
is that country differences, presumably in the overall busi-
ness environment but also in other aspects, matter for firm
performance, while the within-country cross-firm differ-
ences do not. Closer inspection of the country fixed effects
reveals that while not all are significant, the ranking of
countries corresponds to a significant extent to what might
be expected from other measures, such as the EBRD transi-
tion indicators.22 That is, the ranking, for instance, mostly
confirms that firms in the Central European countries have
higher average levels of efficiency than those from either
SEE or the CIS. However, the rankings are not stable
and have a number of unexpected features. For instance,
20 These results may be obtained from the authors on request.
21 These results may be obtained from the authors on request.
22 See EBRD (1995, 1999).
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Serbia and Macedonia consistently rank above the most
economically advanced (new EU) countries such as the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. This suggests that
the country effects are also capturing other sources of het-
erogeneity, such as differences in accounting and reporting
systems. For these very reasons, it is desirable to control for
country effects, realizing that they capture many features of
heterogeneity, rather than excluding them or attributing the
cross-country heterogeneity to just a single factor, such as a
particular aspect of the business environment.
Finally, in order to check if the results are by chance dri-
ven by the particular sample of firms that we use, we have
also carried out some of the key estimations on the AMA-
DEUS data set that contains information on over 150,000
firms in eight transition countries during the period 1997 to
2006.23 Although AMADEUS does not exactly replicate
the variables available in the BEEPS, it does allow us to
estimate very similar specifications to those used above.
Table 5 replicates the estimations reported for BEEPS in
table A4, using the AMADEUS sample. The constraints
variables at the firm level are again the BEEPS average
constraints for the same country, two-digit sector, and firm
size. It can be seen that when entered individually none of
the constraints variables is significant. When entered
jointly, only one variable, tax rates, enters significantly and
with the predicted sign. The remaining constraints are insig-
nificant, with one (macroeconomic instability) being signifi-
cant but perversely signed. The main results hence do not
appear to be driven by any peculiarity of the BEEPS sample
of firms.
B. Using Doing Business and Heritage Foundation
Indicators
In view of our findings based on manager perceptions of
the business environment, a question arises as to whether
the findings are robust in that other measures of the business
and institutional environment would produce similar re-
sults. To answer this question, we have examined the ef-
fects that widely used indices of the business environment
and institutions have when combined with our BEEPS firm-
level data.24 In particular, we have merged our firm-level
data with twelve of the Doing Business indicators produced
by the World Bank. These are the number of procedures to
register a business, time to register a business, cost of regis-
tering a business, rigidity of employment regulations,
restrictions on firing workers, cost of firing a worker, num-
ber of procedures to enforce a contract payment after
default, time to enforce a contract payment after default,
cost of enforcing a contract payment after default, time to
effectuate bankruptcy, cost of effectuating bankruptcy, and
recovery rate in a bankruptcy. As an alternative, we have
also used the ten indices of economic freedom produced by
the Heritage Foundation: trade tariffs, tax rates, government
intervention, monetary policy (inflation), restrictions on for-
eign direct investment, banking and finance sector restric-
tions, wage and price controls, property rights issues, busi-
ness and other regulations, and the extent of informal
markets. The Doing Business indicators are on a 1 to 100
scale or have a natural value (days, number of procedures,
and so on), while the Heritage Foundation indices are mea-
sured on a 1 to 5 scale (1 ¼ best or most free and 5 ¼ worst
or least free). The data for the Heritage Foundation relate to
2001 and 2004, while those for Doing Business were pub-
lished in 2003 and 2006 (and collected mostly in 2002 and
2005).25
A major issue that arises in all studies using the Doing
Business and Heritage Foundation indicators is that the
values of these indicators are highly correlated over time.
For the two years that we use, the Heritage Foundation indi-
cators for our 27 countries have a correlation that ranges
between 0.91 (government intervention) and 0.99 (business
and other regulation). This means that the indicators are
close to being indistinguishable from country fixed effects.
The Doing Business indicators are potentially more inter-
esting than the Heritage Foundation indices for the fixed-
effects regressions because some are less correlated over
time; the correlation coefficients range from 0.84 for time
to start a business to almost 1.0 for contracts procedures.
Yet as may be seen from table 6, when we enter the Doing
Business indicators individually into the IV regressions
with country, industry, and year fixed effects, only three
coefficients are negative, two are positive, and seven are
statistically insignificant. When we enter the indicators
simultaneously, four are negative and eight are insignifi-
cant. Of the three indicators that have a correlation of the
2003 and 2006 values below 0.9 (time to register a business,
cost of registering a business, and restrictions on firing
workers), two generate a negative effect and one a positive
effect when entered individually, while one produces a
negative coefficient and two produce an insignificant coeffi-
cient when entered simultaneously. In the IV regressions
without the fixed effects (not reported in a tabular form
here), only two of the twelve constraints have a negative
effect.
In view of the space constraints, we briefly report the
remaining results in this area without the corresponding
tables.26 When we enter the Doing Business indicators one
at a time into OLS regressions without country, industry,
and year fixed effects, we obtain seven coefficients that are
negative, three that are positive, and two that are statisti-
cally insignificant. When all the business environment indi-
cators are entered simultaneously, six coefficients are nega-
tive, five are positive, and one is statistically insignificant.
Hence, even in the OLS specification without fixed country,
23 The countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine.
24 We thank John DiNardo for suggesting this analytical extension to us.
25 ‘‘Doing Business’’ was first published in 2003.
26 They may be obtained from the authors on request








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sector, and year effects, the Doing Business indicators pro-
vide surprisingly limited support for the traditional hypoth-
esis that constraints have a negative effect on performance,
and the support is even weaker in the OLS specification
with fixed effects and in the IV specifications.
The Heritage Foundation indicators of regulation gener-
ate results that are more in line with the existing literature
and our findings in tables 3 and 4. When we enter the Heri-
tage Foundation indicators one at a time into our OLS re-
gressions without country, industry, and year fixed effects,
the indices all produce the expected negative effects of reg-
ulation or constraints on firm performance, as does a simple
average index of these ten indices. When the ten indices are
entered simultaneously, five retain negative coefficients,
two coefficients turn positive, and three become statistically
insignificant. Our data hence reproduce the traditional result
that when the Heritage indicators are entered one at a time
in an OLS regression, they show a strong negative effect of
regulation on performance. The effects are quite mixed,
however, when the indicators are entered jointly. The fact
that the Heritage Foundation indicators are highly corre-
lated over time is reflected in the OLS estimates with coun-
try, industry, and year fixed effects. When the Heritage
Foundation indicators are entered one at a time, only two of
the ten indicators retain negative coefficients, one becomes
positive, and seven become statistically insignificant. When
all the indicators are entered simultaneously, two coeffi-
cients are negative, three are positive, and five are insignifi-
cant. When we use the Heritage Foundation indicators in
our IV regressions, with or without country, industry, and
year fixed effects, the coefficients of the individual Heritage
Foundation indicators all become insignificant when
entered individually, and they produce three negative, one
to three positive, and four to six insignificant coefficients
when entered simultaneously. Moreover, the coefficients
that are negative are not the same ones in the various speci-
fications. In sum, specifications other than a simple OLS
model with each Heritage Foundation constraint entered
individually basically fail to generate the expected negative
effect of regulation or constraints indicators on firm perfor-
mance.27
Overall, our results indicate that the widely used country-
level indicators of business and institutional environment
do not provide much evidence of a negative relationship
between the constraining environment and firm perfor-
mance. Some of these indicators, particularly the Heritage
Foundation indices, produce evidence consistent with this
hypothesis in the simplest OLS specifications when the
indices are entered one at a time, but not in the specifica-
tions when the indices are entered jointly or models that
control for other relevant factors.
C. Rate of Growth of Revenues
Having looked at the effects of the constraints and the
structural variables capturing ownership, export orientation
and competition on the level of revenue efficiency, we next
address the question of whether these variables have any
effect on the rate of change in the revenue efficiency of
firms. These initial value regressions are estimated on the
smaller number of firms in the BEEPS panel data set. We
have checked the comparability of the panel to the larger
data set by comparing summary statistics and have also
replicated on the panel data the same base estimations as
we present for the pooled cross-sectional data in table 2.
These base estimations performed on the panel data are
reported in table A8.
In table 7 we present the results of relating the 2002–
2005 rate of change of real sales revenues to the lagged
(2002) levels of the ownership, competition, export orienta-
tion, and constraint variables, controlling for the rate of
change in labor and capital over the same period. By con-
struction, these initial value regressions eliminate the possi-
bility that the relationship between efficiency, constraints,
and the structural variables is brought about by contempora-
neous shocks to these variables. Estimation in this instance
is by OLS with country, sector, and year fixed effects
included. While foreign ownership enters positively, and
the coefficient on new private ownership tends to be nega-
tive as before, we do not find evidence for any type of own-
ership having a statistically significant impact on the rate of
change of performance. Export orientation enters positively
and is mostly statistically insignificant, and we are unable
to find any impact from competition. As to the business and
institutional constraints, none of the variables generates a
significant negative effect, whether entered individually or
jointly and the size of the estimated coefficients tends to be
small. We hence find no evidence that the level of per-
ceived constraints matters for subsequent rate of change of
performance. In particular, the different aspects of the busi-
ness environment, as measured by these reported con-
straints, do not affect the subsequent rate of change of effi-
ciency with which firms generate revenue from inputs.
V. What Matters for Firm Performance?
Given that indicators of the business environment have
been widely used by both international organizations, such
as the World Bank, and national development assistance
agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment, in formulating key policies and awarding large
amounts of assistance, our finding that one cannot detect
significant effects of these indicators on firm performance is
sobering. Since development funds may be used for alterna-
tive policies, our result also raises the issue of whether indi-
27 The power of the tests is obviously low in those instances when we
are exploiting the limited variation in the values of these indices over time
and one might not be rejecting the null hypothesis of no effects of the
constraints even when this null hypothesis is false. The point that we are
making is simply that with the indicators at hand, one does not generate
the expected negative effect when controlling for cross-country heteroge-
neity.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cators of other externally supported development policies
yield similarly insignificant or significant effects on perfor-
mance. While an elaborate treatment of this topic is beyond
the scope of this paper, we take a step toward answering
this question by exploring whether indicators that have been
found to be significant in explaining performance at a coun-
try level, such as country-wide tertiary school enrollment or
expenditures on health care relative to GDP, also have a
significant effect on firm performance, relative to the busi-
ness environment constraints. As a first-order approxima-
tion, one may think of these two alternative indicators as
proxies for allocating development funds to improvements
in human capital as opposed to the business environment.
In tables 8 and 9 we use the BEEPS data and the BEEPs
data merged with the Doing Business indicators, respec-
tively, to generate IV estimates of the performance effects
of the business environment, tertiary school enrollment,
expenditures on health care scaled by GDP, and GDP per
capita. The data set is somewhat smaller than the one used
earlier because of missing observations on tertiary school
enrollment or health care expenditure, or both, in some
countries. Hence, for consistency of exposition, the first
two columns of each table report the baseline IV regres-
sions without fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 report the cor-
responding regressions with year, country, and sector fixed
effects. Columns 5 and 6 add tertiary school enrollment and
per capita GDP expenditures on health care to the specifica-
tion of columns 1 and 2, thus providing a direct test of the
relative importance of business constraints, tertiary school
enrollment, and health care expenditure per GDP on perfor-
mance. Finally, in columns 7 and 8, we add GDP per capita
as a regressor to these equations to assess whether this over-
all proxy of economic development is a better or worse pre-
dictor of firm performance than the other variables. Col-
umns titled ‘‘Individual Constraints’’ refer to regressions
that contain one constraint at a time. In these columns, each
row corresponds to a different regression. Columns titled
‘‘All Constraints’’ report a single regression in which all the
constraints are entered simultaneously.
Starting with the BEEPs data in table 8, we see that in
columns 1 to 4, we largely replicate our earlier findings
from tables 3 and 4. When we enter the tertiary school
enrollment and health care explanatory variables in addition
to the business environment constraints, we find in columns
5 and 6 that the estimated effects of the business constraints
are by and large unaffected and the education and health
care effects are also insignificant. When we add GDP per
capita as a regressor, we observe a positive effect of GDP
per capita, while the effects of the business environment
constraints become by and large insignificant and their loss
of significance is especially notable when they are entered
one at a time (column 7). The comparison of columns 1 and

























Cost of financing 0.168*** 0.057 0.021 0.013 0.174*** 0.061 0.002 0.031
[0.060] [0.064] [0.037] [0.046] [0.056] [0.065] [0.073] [0.056]
Infrastructure 0.337*** 0.303*** 0.042 0.007 0.372*** 0.299** 0.060 0.062
[0.099] [0.102] [0.055] [0.069] [0.108] [0.108] [0.117] [0.115]
Tax rates 0.225*** 0.117 0.030 0.019 0.239*** 0.134* 0.058 0.081*
[0.066] [0.074] [0.035] [0.049] [0.067] [0.049] [0.067] [0.048]
Customs/foreign trade regulations 0.127* 0.062 0.003 0.075 0.126* 0.067 0.012 0.089*
[0.067] [0.070] [0.036] [0.051] [0.067] [0.050] [0.069] [0.067]
Business licensing and permits 0.149** 0.053 0.083* 0.091 0.150* 0.052 0.038 0.056
[0.071] [0.076] [0.045] [0.056] [0.069] [0.050] [0.052] [0.056]
Macroeconomic instability 0.175*** 0.124* 0.055 0.023 0.172** 0.113* 0.043 0.052
[0.060] [0.070] [0.048] [0.049] [0.061] [0.048] [0.048] [0.053]
Corruption 0.096 0.020 0.072* 0.044 0.091 0.040 0.009 0.008
[0.060] [0.082] [0.041] [0.056] [0.059] [0.079] [0.042] [0.042]
Street crime, theft, and disorder 0.031 0.227** 0.068* 0.006 0.035 0.231** 0.035 0.019
[0.071] [0.094] [0.041] [0.065] [0.074] [0.065] [0.043] [0.043]
Anticompetitive practices 0.185** 0.090 0.057 0.049 0.208*** 0.113 0.008 0.031
[0.077] [0.101] [0.050] [0.057] [0.080] [0.099] [0.101] [0.101]
Year, country, and sector fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No No No
Log GDP per capita No No No No No No Yes 0.442**
[0.199]
Tertiary school enrollment (%) No No No No Yes 0.078 Yes 0.071
[0.432] [0.197]
Health expenditure/GDP (%) No No No No Yes 0.004 Yes 0.040
[0.045] [0.028]
Observations 3,727 3,727 3,727 3,727
R2 0.389 0.696 0.366 0.695
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium, and large) in brackets. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. All columns report coefficients of
IV regressions of log sales on log(employment), log (assets), log (1þexports/sales), ownership variables, a dummy for more than three competitors, and contraints. To save space, we decided not to report the point
estimates of those variables. Results are similar to those found in tables 3 and 4. Individual refers to a regression of the dependent variable on the regressors mentioned above and the individual constraint specified in
that row.
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2, 3 and 4, and 7 and 8 suggests that the country fixed
effects that eliminate the effect of the individual business
constraints are well approximated by intercountry differ-
ences in GDP per capita.
In table 9 we carry out the same estimations while repla-
cing the BEEPS manager responses with the Doing Busi-
ness indicators. The results in this table suggest that ter-
tiary school enrollment or health care expenditures, or
both, have a positive effect on firm performance, while the
effect of business constraints is mostly insignificant; in the
instances when it is significant, it is often positive rather
than negative. In column 6 of table 9, for instance, the ter-
tiary school enrollment variable generates a strong, positive
coefficient, while five of the twelve coefficients of the
Doing Business indicators are insignificant, four are actu-
ally positive, and only three are negative, as predicted. In
column 8, health care expenditure and GDP per capita are
positively associated with efficiency, while only one of the
Doing Business indicators is significant and positive.
Results based on Heritage Foundation indicators (not
reported in a tabular form here) are similar. The results in
tables 8 and 9 suggest that human capital and other effects
associated with greater tertiary school enrollment and
health care expenditures may be more systematically con-
ducive to firm efficiency than lighter business environment
constraints.
VI. Conclusion
It has become fashionable in recent years to argue that
the business environment plays a major role in determining
the overall strength of a given economy, primarily through
its impact on the performance of firms. ‘‘Bad’’ business
environments—commonly characterized as those in which,
for example, corruption and regulation are high and there is
pervasive uncertainty with respect to taxation, business
licensing, or even macroeconomic policy—are widely
believed to cause poor economic performance. The evi-

























Registering a business (number
of procedures)
0.027 0.118** 0.021 0.045 0.041* 0.087** 0.029*** 0.034
[0.020] [0.046] [0.032] [0.041] [0.023] [0.042] [0.009] [0.021]
Registering a business (time in days) 0.001 0.001 0.009** 0.031 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.025] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Registering a business (cost in % GNI) 0.009*** 0.005* 0.012** 0.007 0.009*** 0.004 0.000 0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.011] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Employing workers (rigidity
of employment)
0.013*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.039 0.013*** 0.012** 0.005** 0.007
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.012]
Employing workers (firing) 0.001 0.007*** 0.005 0.042 0.001 0.009*** 0.001 0.006
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.044] [0.007] [0.002] [0.001] [0.007]
Employing workers (firing cost
in weeks of wages)
0.001 0.001 0.009 0.067 0.001 0.004* 0.003* 0.004
[0.004] [0.002] [0.013] [0.047] [0.013] [0.013] [0.002] [0.005]
Enforcing a contract (number
of procedures)
0.012* 0.015 0.076 0.071 0.015** 0.004 0.013*** 0.015*
[0.007] [0.011] [0.055] [0.079] [0.007] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006]
Enforcing a contract
(time in days)
0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.023] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Enforcing a contract
(cost in % of debt)
0.003 0.020 0.018 0.064 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.002
[0.014] [0.012] [0.017] [0.070] [0.013] [0.012] [0.017] [0.013]
Closing a business (time in years) 0.020 0.070*** 0.376 0.313 0.019 0.078*** 0.064*** 0.057
[0.021] [0.026] [0.253] [0.406] [0.253] [0.026] [0.253] [0.015]
Closing a business (cost in % of estate) 0.013*** 0.032*** 0.543*** 0.068 0.017*** 0.016 0.004 0.003
[0.004] [0.012] [0.209] [1.134] [0.004] [0.210] [0.004] [0.005]
Closing a business [100 - (recovery
rate in cents to the dollar)]
0.006 0.025*** 0.013 0.035 0.005 0.020*** 0.006* 0.006
[0.006] [0.008] [0.010] [0.023] [0.006] [0.007] [0.023] [0.004]
Year, country, and sector fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No No No
Log GDP per capita No No No No No No Yes 0.739**
[0.338]
Tertiary school enrollment (%) No No No No Yes 1.222*** Yes 0.726
[0.257] [0.820]
Health expenditure/GDP (%) No No No No Yes 0.052 Yes 0.144**
[0.042] [0.071]
Observations 4,050 4,050 4,050 4,050
R2 0.738 0.794 0.767 0.774
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium, and large) in brackets. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. All columns report coefficients of
IV regressions of log sales on log(employment), log (assets), log (1þexports/sales), ownership variables, a dummy for more than three competitors, and constraints. To save space, we decided not to report the point
estimates of those variables. Results are similar to those found in tables 3 and 4. Individual refers to a regression of the dependent variable on the regressors mentioned above and the individual constraint specified in
that row. The Doing Business Indicators measure elements of the business climate on a country level. A higher score indicates that the business climate is worse. All Indicators are measured as defined, except for
‘‘Employing Workers [Rigidity of Employment]’’ and ‘‘Employing Workers (Firing),’’ which are measured on a scale from 0 to 100 (100 is the most rigid). The Doing Business Indicators report ‘‘Closing a Business
[Recovery Rate in Cents to the Dollar].’’ This was recoded to ‘‘Closing a Business [100  Recovery Rate in Cents to the Dollar]’’ such that, consistent with the other indicators, a higher score is associated with a
worse business climate.
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dence for such conclusions has been drawn from a variety
of sources, including cross-country estimations of growth
but also, increasingly, from firm-level surveys that have
gathered subjective information on perceived constraints to
activity emanating from the business environment. How-
ever, while the general thrust of the argument—that
the business environment is an important determinant of
economic performance—carries considerable intuitive
appeal, the importance of establishing the hypothesized
relationship through careful analysis of data cannot be
emphasized enough. A similar reasoning applies to the rela-
tively broadly accepted notion that private ownership of
basically any kind generates superior performance to state
ownership of firms. Indeed, a certain amount of recent
research in this area using aggregate and firm-level survey
evidence may be misleading through its reliance on rela-
tively simple econometric implementation that may suffer
from biases due to omitted variables, measurement error,
and endogeneity.
In this paper, we have addressed the challenge by using
firm-level information (the BEEPS and, to a lesser extent,
the AMADEUS data set), as well as country-level Doing
Business and Heritage Foundation indicators, to analyze
the performance effects of firm’s ownership, competition,
export orientation, and the business (institutional) environ-
ment. To that end, we have employed a variety of ap-
proaches, including instrumental variables and using aver-
age values of constraints reported by other firms with
similar characteristics. We find evidence that ownership
and competition exert an impact on performance, but the
results differ from much of the earlier literature in that for-
eign ownership of firms has a positive effect on perfor-
mance but domestic private ownership does not. Export
orientation of the firm is found to have a positive effect on
performance in simple specifications, but the effect disap-
pears once firm ownership is taken into account (foreign
firms tend to be the principal efficient exporters). When we
examine the impact of perceived business environment con-
straints, we find that few retain explanatory power, in either
IV or OLS specification, once they are entered simulta-
neously rather than one at a time, or once country, year, and
sector fixed effects are introduced. Indeed, country fixed
effects largely absorb the explanatory power of the con-
straints in all specifications. In neither the level equations
nor the initial value rates of change regressions can we
identify any strong and robust effects of these variables.
The lack of an effect is found in both the BEEPS and AMA-
DEUS firm-level data and in firm-level (BEEPS) and coun-
try level (Doing Business and Heritage) indicators of busi-
ness environment. It is thus not brought about by a
peculiarity of a given data set.
The lack of a detectable effect of the reported severity of
various constraints in the business environment could
reflect the fact that (a) firms can get around these con-
straints at a relatively low cost and the effect is hence not
detectable in the data (for example, the firms may pay a
bribe to obtain a license, but the cost of the bribe is small);
or (b) managers who face severe constraints compensate for
the presence of these constraints and report lower severity
than is actually the case (for example, firms that need more
external financing may ‘‘pre-save’’ from retained earnings
and consequently report a lower severity of the financing
constraint than is in fact the case). Since we observe signifi-
cant variation in reported constraints across firms, the latter
phenomenon of compensating for constraints may reduce
the observed effect of constraints but is unlikely to elimi-
nate it altogether.
In order to see if the overall results are brought about by
some peculiarity of our business environment data, we have
also replicated the level equations using the country-level
indicators of the business environment provided by the
Heritage Foundation and the World Bank. We again do not
detect a systematic relationship between constraints and
performance.
We show that country effects, reflecting differences in
the business environment but also many other factors, mat-
ter for firm performance but that differences in the business
environment constraints observed across firms within coun-
tries do not. Moreover, the limited firm- and country-level
variations in the business environment over time do not
appear to affect performance either. A closer inspection of
the country fixed effects reveals that they are to some extent
correlated with the expected differences in corporate perfor-
mance but are also likely to be capturing other sources of
cross-country heterogeneity. Given that much donor fund-
ing has been conditioned on improvements in the business
environment, our findings raise the question of whether
other development policies that use bilateral or multilateral
funding yield similarly insignificant effects. We take a step
toward answering this question by exploring whether indi-
cators such as country-wide tertiary school enrollment or
expenditures on health care—proxies for policies aimed at
improvements in human capital—have a significant effect
on firm performance relative to the business environment
constraints. We find that in some regressions, tertiary
school enrollment and health care expenditure per GDP
have stronger (positive) effects on firm performance than
Doing Business or Heritage Foundation indicators of busi-
ness environment. Including GDP per capita has a positive
effect on performance in all regressions and suggests that
the country fixed effects that eliminate the effect of the indi-
vidual business constraints in our earlier regressions are
well approximated by intercountry differences in GDP per
capita.
Overall, our analysis brings into question the conven-
tional wisdom in this important area. It suggests that ana-
lysts’ ability to identify the effect of business environment
on performance, and possibly the effect itself, have been
more limited than has been widely assumed to date. It indi-
cates that it is important to control for country effects, rea-
lizing that they capture many features of heterogeneity,
rather than excluding them or attributing the cross-country
328 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
heterogeneity to just a single factor such as the business
(institutional) environment. Finally, the evidence suggests
that policymakers ought not to rely on simple indicators of
business environment and that further discussion and
research are needed about the relative merits of alternative
development policies and funding priorities.
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336 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
TABLE A8.—REVENUE EFFICIENCY: BASELINE REGRESSIONS ON PANEL DATA
IV Estimation with Year, Country, and Sector Fixed Effects
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Log employment 0.389** 0.457*** 0.402** 0.489*** 0.755*** 0.731*** 0.735*** 0.710***
[0.169] [0.171] [0.174] [0.173] [0.189] [0.193] [0.193] [0.204]
Log assets 0.709*** 0.610*** 0.702*** 0.578*** 0.289 0.316 0.321 0.349
[0.187] [0.200] [0.192] [0.202] [0.225] [0.244] [0.229] [0.255]
Log (1 þ exports/sales) 0.825 1.021 0.005 0.023
[0.593] [0.670] [0.683] [0.775]
More than three competitors 0.004 0.007 0.069 0.067
[0.081] [0.074] [0.073] [0.075]
Ownership (privatized) 0.235 0.208 0.401 0.388
[0.427] [0.445] [0.422] [0.455]
Ownership (new private) 0.089 0.053 0.215 0.180
[0.317] [0.349] [0.314] [0.352]
Ownership (foreign) 1.904*** 1.942*** 1.835*** 1.878***
[0.473] [0.452] [0.447] [0.414]
Constant 1.343*** 1.446*** 1.292*** 1.418*** 1.471** 1.459** 1.367** 1.348*
[0.330] [0.336] [0.373] [0.367] [0.592] [0.680] [0.609] [0.711]
Observations 1,372 1,355 1,322 1,305 1,372 1,355 1,322 1,305
J-test 16.75 15.34 16.94 14.76 6.55 5.01 6.70 4.98
p-value 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.162 0.025 0.035 0.418
First-stage F-tests
Log employment 42.19 41.40 50.78 49.46 42.19 41.40 50.78 49.46
Log assets 17.89 18.04 19.05 19.32 17.89 18.04 19.05 19.32
Log (1 þ exports/sales) 5.86 5.22 5.86 5.22
Ownership (privatized) 5.94 5.77 6.73 6.62
Ownership (new private) 22.00 23.12 25.48 26.85
Ownership (foreign) 5.75 5.81 5.91 5.91
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 8.16 5.91 6.67 6.35 6.96 5.75 6.06 6.13
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry, and firm size (small, medium, and large) in brackets. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. All models were estimated using
IVs for log employment, log assets, log (1 þ export/sales), and three ownership dummies. The IVs are firm’s age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio–age interaction, location (city), % change in fixed assets
in previous period, % change in exports in previous period, full-time employees in previous period. The skill ratio and the skill ratio–age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE, and CIS) dummies.
337BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, EXPORTS, OWNERSHIP, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
